Probably a lot more than that too . . . both the PSX and Saturn were being sold at considerable losses (for manufacturing+distribution costs at the very least), and with the PSX doing so in spite of a simpler/cheaper design AND vertical integration, the Saturn (once Sega made the sacrifice to price-match Sony)
Sony's design almost certainly cost more to design (R&D wise), but heavier R&D investment for a more efficient design relative to manufacturing cost to performance is an extremely smart management move for any long-run product. (Atari/Flare made that sacrifice with the Jaguar, though it obviously didn't pay off for them due to other factors ;) -and still having the issue of relevance of design features)Quote:
2# Design efficiency & relevance - Whist their machine cost more to manufacture, its results were not actually any better than Playstation, and, in fact it had many inferior aspects, its hardware was also focussed on the wrong areas for market conditions of the time.
Definitely true.Quote:
3# The system was launched at a stupid time of year, with a stupid surprise launch.
Crappy tools AND documentation too . . . the latter had been a problem for Sega for some time with previous platforms (in part due to poor translation and part due to general lack of completeness), the lack of an API on top of that made a big mess. (without good low-level documentation, 3rd parties would be hard-pressed to comprehensively use the hardware -either programming the hardware directly or building their own APIs- . . . ideally you'd want both good libraries and good documentation, but at least have 1 of the 2 -and in a timely manner . . . having 1 or both of those months or years after the release isn't really helpful)Quote:
5# Crappy dev tools. You can talk about how Sega did things "the way they'd historically always been done" in the industry, but this is not an excuse. Sega stayed still in this area, there was nothing stopping them from looking at ways of improving their business, and anticipating the importance of dev tools in the same way that Sony did. Sony caught the old stallwarts with their pants down because their business practices had become stagnant.
The N64 was problematic in this regard too . . . and the PS2. (though the PS2 at least had comprehensive low-level documentation facilitating 3rd party middleware and low-level optimized games too)
Yes, and they also screwed up their brand-name in general with the 32x+Saturn conflict (and Genesis/CD alongside those) on top of the Saturn's own problems and general software direction issues.Quote:
6# Sega had one big, and crucial advantage over Sony, they had built up a range of exclusive, and popular IPs, and characters associated with their brand name, essentially a fanbase which had already been built up giving them a huge headstart over Sony. Shockingly Sega didn't bother focussing any effort at all in this area.
Mid-90s Sega was a perfect storm of bad/conflicting decisions and mismanagement.
On top of what you've mentioned, there's also the issue of Sega's overall advertising, marketing, and distribution being highly problematic with the Saturn . . . and the problems at the retail end (in terms of software and hardware availability as well as in-store ads/displays) obviously weren't helped by Sega's PR issues and (especially) the direct harm they did to their retail relationships with the Saturn surprise launch. (and supply shortages even with the few retailers not shocked by the release)
They also got lucky with pretty much every other company making huge mistakes on the market at the time and/or being inherently weak (like Atari) or just plain pig-headed (like Nintendo).
Sony got pretty much everything right, from the hardware end to the SDKs to having relatively open and friendly licensing agreements (compared to Nintendo) to tactfully investing in certain 3rd party games as exclusives as well as investing to build-on in-house/2nd party software development resources (Psygnosis in particular -who was also instrumental in developing the SDKs), and then the marketing. (and management and funding to back all that up . . . and buffering some of the blunders like dumping the PSX's price -which could have killed companies with lesser credit/PR/reserves given how big a loss they were selling and how the RAM/component prices didn't drop as predicted -meaning heavier losses as prices dropped prior to late 1996; even with Sony's vertical integration, they'd taken a big risk -which ended up paying off in the end . . . and still was obviously a lesser risk than it would have been to smaller companies)
Sega did many of the same things with the Genesis, but also had more conflicts and more significant mistakes (and even more costly ones given their limited resources) . . . and obviously there was the non-uniform success in Japan and the west.
Sony was either very smart (investing in market research to cater to all regions and learn from others' mistakes) and lucky on top of that. Nintendo had many of the same advantages when they brought the NES to the US: they'd been pushing to get into the US market for some 3 years by the time the NES had its official launch, and they'd almost certainly invested significantly into learning the market's needs (and exploitable weaknesses). The biggest difference from Nintendo and Sony's tactics is obviously that Nintendo was horribly limiting on 3rd party publishers across the board (and equally hurtful to competing hardware firms) while Sony only really limited competition in cases of direct partnership/buy-outs of software firms. (more like what Sega did in some respects; and even then, things often turned out quite well -especially compared to Nintendo or especially Microsoft, and -again- more like Sega's partnerships than anything else)
Albeit Nintendo screwed that up in Europe (which Sega oddly managed that well with the SMS), where Sony seems to have gotten all regions right. (at least by the time it really mattered -fall of 1996)
They certainly didn't do what NEC had done. ;)
In Japan and Europe, marketing may have been off, but in the US, they probably couldn't have done much better on the advertizing end (maybe some directly competitive ads against the PS2 to try and counter some of the hype with real-world comparisons).Quote:
And yeah, Dreamcast was pretty perfect too, I mean, you could fault some of their advertising in some reasons, but nothing was really glaringly bad (and a lot of that wasn't helped by their lack of funds either). Dreamcasts big problem was fighting consumer apathy which had built up towards Sega over time IMO.
However, the big criticism on marketing I'd have is with the investment in price drops and packing in the modem as standard (and the massive rebate offers for seganet sign-on). All of those factors meant Sega losing far more money in the short-run for high-risk investments at a time when they couldn't remotely afford it. The DC's launch price would have remained compelling and competitive if unchanged at least up to 2001 (dropping the price below the GC could have kept it the cheapest new-gen system on the market while not sacrificing profits nearly so much -or indeed, selling hardware for profit by that point). And while the internet gimmick was significant, they also were far to reckless with investments in that . . . a more realistically conservative approach would have been to use 3rd party ISPs alone and offer the modem as an accessory and in special deluxe bundles with the browser and keyboard included. (and, if the DC had lasting success on the market, they could later release an ethernet adapter around 2001)
It still may not have been enough to keep the DC profitable, but a more moderated and conservative approach at very least would have made more sense. (in fact, lack of sensible moderation had been one of Sega's biggest problems for a long time -in different ways for both SoJ and SoA, from excessive hardware releases to excessive investment spending- . . . and as I've said before, I wonder if Mike Katz might have made a difference in the long-run towards addressing that problem)
And, aside from cases of actual price dumping (and selling below cost), there's not really anything wrong with that. (if the domestic manufacturers aren't going to emphasize on price-performance for the market needs, then that leaves the market wide-open for competition to do so)
There's also the issue of cheap labor and different worker restrictions and such, so that makes the cost/price advantage issue even more complex. (aside from dumping)
I used to think this too . . . but in hindsight, I think Sony ended up being much healthier for the industry than they could have been given their position.Quote:
You can say that in the end, Sony had a very damaging impact on the industry (and I would kind of agree with you), but at the end of the day I don't think its surprising that magazines like EDGE would get so excited by the appearance of Sony's "big business" methods, and professionalism. Sony clearly showed with the western launch of Playstation that they knew what they were doing, Sony were bringing tons of money into the industry, and videogaming was becoming less stygmatised (which was making their jobs a lot easier too). Sony had made a machine with a great cost to power ratio, games were out fast which were both fun, and showed the capabilities of the machine, Sony had been good for giving 3rd parties good tools to increase software output, and there'd brought big business professionalism to advertising/image etc, all of which are going to lead to people (including EDGE staff) exclaiming "holyshitlookatthisnewmachine!"
What Nintendo did with the SNES was far more harmful (not just to competing platforms, but software developers), and Sony was the one to finally and definitively break Nintendo in Japan . . . and rather than perpetuating the restrictive licensing a la Nintendo (let alone the harsh relationships with 3rd parties), Sony instead managed a relatively open and positive buisness model with 3rd party publishers. And, again, even with developers they bought-up, they ended up managing far better than similar cases with Nintendo or (especially) Microsoft.
It probably would have been better (and certainly more interesting) if Sony's competition had been healthier and more capable (keeping a more mixed and diverse hardware market as well as software -and forcing Sony to be even more flexible with 3rd parties), but as it was, the market may not have been better off without them. (especially if it would have meant Nintendo retaining much more of theri power . . . though maybe the Saturn would have largely taken the PSX's place, at least in Japan -still potentially a much more confused mess, and with Sega's management history, hardly clear-cut either) Likewise, if Sony HAD been on the market, but done a relatively mediocre job of management/marketing (or worse hardware for that matter) more like NEC had done previously, that still wouldn't have really helped either in the same way NEC had failed to break Nintendo's monopoly in Japan (even with the attraction of CD-ROM and a much earlier release).
Having Sega wake-up earlier and push for a more efficient business model (internally and in terms of the market needs), NEC doing the same, or Atari, or Nintendo actually changing to an open and competitive business model and forging positive relations with publishers, it could have been a different story (with or without Sony). If Atari had had healthy management to follow up the 7800 with a 16-bit gen console, it certainyl could have been healthy for the market (especially if catering to a lower-end niche like the 7800 -something that no new consoles were doing then, or now for that matter) . . . not to mention what the computer market might be like today if Atari (or CBM) had had more competitive management. ;)
Now, Microsoft never entering the console hardware scene is a much more direct argument to make towards a healthier industry . . . especially if they'd stayed away from buying 3rd party developers. (or if MS had pushed for a more open business model with friendly relations and good management of publishers/developers in-house and 3rd party -but that's never goint to happen :p )
And NEC, and 3DO, and Atari, and Nintendo all in different ways. ;) (well, Nintendo pretty much in the same ways they always had -it just stopped working in their favor)Quote:
It also doesn't help that Sega did everything so badly, making Sony look even better/more professional by comparison ;)

