Right, I misspoke on that one... I meant if the Saturn hadn't bombed there would have been no reason for the Neptune to be useful in the late 90s. (in any case it would only detract from the MD -and potentially CD- in the budget market anyway)
As for the Saturn not bombing if the 32x wasn't there... maybe, maybe not. If they'd done nothing else different, I can't see the Saturn doing a whole lot better, but the very context of the 32x not being there implies better management/forsight/etc on Sega's part and thus implies better management in regards to the Saturn... assuming "not releasing the 32x" also includes "not releasing the older mars project" (the enhanced MD derivative).
I don't know what SoJ and SoA were thinking at the time, but apparently Mars was born at SoJ out of a combination of concerns from the slump on the US market (starting in '93 and not truly ending until the 5th gen was in full swing in late '96/97) on top of the unsettling hype and positioning of the Jaguar and 3DO in 1992 (we know today that they both flopped on the mass market, but back in 1993, that was not remotely clear -more extreme for the Jaguar which had the right price, a large developer sign-on list, an intense amount of hype with gaining investors etc). And on top of all that there were signs in late 1993 that the Saturn was not going to be ready for the 1994 release (so Mars could even have been important in Japan). And, of course, Sony and Nintendo both announced their nextgen entries in summer/fall of 1993.
But instead of deciding to push more Genesis/CD games to combat the slump (much safer from a profit/stability POV, more risky in terms of keeping their investors happy and continue growth with high revenue figures) or addressing the increasing nextgen competition with a streamlined and accelerated version of the Saturn (cutting out more problematic and expensive features to allow more definite production readiness and a reasonable price point as a mass market machine and not a high-end multimedia niche -and retaining comprehensive provisions for expansion of RAM -maybe more than that- to address the corresponding limitations of a cost effective 1994/1995 design). I'm not sure of the state of the Saturn in late 1993 (the time that any such redesigns would have needed to take place if they were still adamant about a 1994 Japan release).
And then there's the issues of marketing (one thing the lack of 32x/mars certainly would streamline), the odd software direction for the Saturn (especially first party -lack of key franchise installments like Sega Sports and Sonic at launch, let alone cancellation of stuff like the 3rd EC game -and odd lack of 32x games being moved onto Saturn, especially some higher-end ones like Shadow of Atlantis let alone the ones that were fully completed and released on 32x -it's not like the 32x stole them from the Saturn either... if we say delayed releases of such games on the Saturn that would be an argument, but a total lack is what we see -except Doom, but that's more than just a delay and was a port of the PSX game, not the 32x version -the 32x version may have actually performed a good bit better on the Saturn than the PSX derivative)
And then there's other stuff like focusing more on good development tools (regardless of the hardware complexity or cost, the tools were lacking for the mid/late 90s standards, and if nothing else, Sega should have gotten their asses in gear as soon as they realized what Sony was offering)
Well, not so much that sort of mess... but certainly a culmination of things that both led to the problems with 32x and Saturn as well as other things. (some dependent on events of 32x and Saturn, and others adding onto the situation -troubles in the arcade, shift in management, clash of regional management)The theory you're laying out with that sentence structure is some real Twelve Monkeys Cassandra Complex shit -- that Sega released the 32X with the foreknowledge that the Saturn would bomb before they ever released it, with the added paradox of helping to guarantee the latter's failure through the former's creation -- Sega, yes, was some kind of idiot-savant, mad-genius clusterfuck of an arthouse posing as an electronics company, and the real nature of the dichotomy may have been East Versus West.
There's a lot that we know very little about though, including the true nature of the regional conflict.
It's pretty clear that the Saturn was not known to be released when it was by SoA or SoJ when Mars was initiated in January of 1994, though SoJ certainly wanted to release Saturn in fall of 1994, Nakayma had doubts it would be ready... Mars itself had a hell of a lot more to do with the market situation in North American and how Nakayma felt it should be addressed. (some have claimed that Nakayma overstepped his expertise in both SoA and SoJ management and push far to heavily on things he didn't understand -he understood the nature and dynamics of the Arcade market far more than the home console market, but as President and CEO he had the final say in all operations)
It's a real shame that Nakayma responded with Mars for SoA rather than something else... like letting them be part of the final revision of the Saturn hardware that was still under way at the time. Granted, SoJ had specifically declined previous offers to collaborate on nextgen hardware projects (the SGI proposal and initiated spec's "wish list" compiled from Imagesoft and STI programmers/development staff -albeit neither of those were calling for Sega specific hardware, one with SGI's chipset and the other with proposed collaboration with Sony -though SoJ could at least have taken the proposal for hardware specs/features under advisement with ongoing Saturn development), it would have been better late than never, but certainly better if SoJ had responded with such after the STI and/or Sony proposals. (ie directly responded by cutting SoA in on some of the development process of the Saturn in mid 1993 -SoJ did the reverse with Mars with SoJ engineers aiding with 32x design work in early 1994 and that was actually the start of a pretty strong relationship up until the formal announcement of the Saturn's launch date strained it -and eventually contributed to some SoA engineers leaving the company it seems)
Declining the Sony partnership may have been wise (no telling if Sega would have gotten screwed by the fine print -Nintendo nearly ended up as a glorified 2nd party on the SNES CD) and the STI chipset may haev been delayed as it was with Nintendo to a point where it would have been unacceptable for Japan and Europe (1996 was OK for North America, but Europe and Japan were ready to move on sooner -especially Japan).
I've said it before, but claiming any one thing led to Sega's downfall (especially a console) is a bit like saying the 5200 killed Atari Inc, or ET did, or Pac man... it was none of those things either (all were symptoms of the underlying management problems, but the biggest issue was in distribution with overinflated demand figures due to poor regulation -that was happening with other companies but especially Atari and their instability combined with a >70% monopoly on the market and then Commodore shaking things up with its price war drove the industry as a whole to be dragged into the 1983 crash -and panic/shortsightedness of the media and console manufactuers made things worse in several areas).
Likewise, Sega and Atari were both not finished after those huge problems either, even though there had been some exacerbating issues (Atari had a freeze on operations in late '83 weakening their computer market, Sega screwed up with a smooth transition from Saturn to Dreamcast in '97-99), but then made additional mistakes that sealed the final thing. (in this case, not very similar as Atari Inc itself was turning around due to the expert management of James Morgan, but Warner then decided to sell off the company assets and liquidate it in mid 1984 -which it did to Trammel Technologies LTD which became Atari Corp- and they did so in an incredibly harmful and sloppy manner -not even notifying senior Atai Inc management including Morgan himself until minutes until the final agreement was signed- that was exacerbated by the timing of 4th of July vacation; OTOH Sega had one last chance with the DC and they did a lot right, but pushed too hard in many ways for the position they were in, it may have been do or die but they were not in the same position as they'd been in 1989 against Nintendo and the heavy spending went too unchecked to really hold fast against the PS2's onslaught while still turning a net profit -they couldn't have gone too conservative but certainly could have tempered things better for a company in their financial position, they certainly got the software and marketing direction right for the US market with the DC... had that been the same for the Saturn they might have pulled out in the middle with that one in spite of the 32x/cost/other management problems -then there's some added things like expanding their PC market to supplement the DC, but this is already really off topic)


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