The problem with that part of Kalinske's interview is that many of those issues had already been pushed (or actuall initiated/accomplished) by Mike Katz prior to Kalinske becoming president in '91.
Katz started the competitive advertising directly against Nintendo, he expanded thecelebrity lisencing signfiicantly, he pushed more for Western developer/publisher support (both for Sega projects and for general 3rd party licensing/publishing -including the very deft handling with EA's threat to go unlicensed).
It also seemd like he was pushing for lower prices and more bundle options too, with $30 the rebate offer introduced in late 1990, dropping the price to a nominal $159.99 and some extra free game offers appearing earlier that year. (and obviously some of that is time limited -hardware gets cheaper as time goes on)
I also think Katz's initial skepticism of Sonic is exaggerated . . . I'm confident that his feelings would have changed as development progressed and the game itself became more tangible. Besides that, SoA still ended up investing significantly in making Sonic more marketable for the US (and it seems that fed back into Japan to some extent, given the final art work looks much closer to the US efforts than the early art -albeit also better in quality than the US box art

). And, of course, even if SoA management had truly felt that Sonic was an unmarketable masscot, they potentially could have pushed for a sprite swap (seval other games saw significnatly bigger modifications than that for localization, for better or worse -it actually may have been wise to do that for Alex Kidd back in the mid 80s . . . at least in the US, though Sega's marketing/management in general with the SMS was a far bigger issue than quirky Japanese art style)
Katz made it pretty clear in his interview with Melf that Sonic was not the reason for his leaving. The problem was not having enough "warm fuzzies" (too direct/straightforward/too the point) when dealing with SoJ management, and SoJ being that sensitive/fickle is quite possibly one of the biggest early warning signs of Sega's fundamental management/communication problems that were largely responsible for what happened later on. (had there not been that conflict, I think Katz may actually have been healthier for Sega than Kalinske, at least in terms of long-term stability -he was willing to push things to make Sega really competitive and he knew the market he was dealing with, but he also seemed to be more realistic than Kalinske and less fast and loose with spending -I doubt he'd have pushed investment spending as far as Kalinske did, and indeed, he had the experience of working at Atari Corp with extremely tight resources in 1985-1988)
The "warm fuzzies" issue probably wasn't helped by his time spend working with Jack Tramiel either.
